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Abstract—Providing forward and backward secrecy is still a
big challenge in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs),
though some storage schemes have been proposed. Additionally,
high storage requirement needs efficient storage techniques. In
this paper, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption and
key-evolution based scheme for efficient and secure data storage,
which supports both forward and backward secrecy in UWSNs.
We show that the stored data based on our scheme can be used
to efficiently compute statistic values, e.g., expected value and
variance of the sensed data, and at the same time the storage
cost is significantly reduced using our scheme. Detailed analysis
has been conducted to evaluate the scheme in terms of efficiency
and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research aspects of security in Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) has gained some progress [1] recently in the research
community. Most proposed security schemes, however, are
based on assumption that a trusted party (sink or base sta-
tion) is always available, leading to that unnormal actions of
compromised sensors can be detected by the on-line sink [2].
However, in Unattended WSNs (UWSNs) [3], there is no static
sink but a mobile sink periodically accesses the UWSN to col-
lect data instead, and the sensor nodes store their sensed data
locally or at some special designated nodes within the network
till a mobile sink visit, instead of immediately forwarding the
data to a centralized location out of the network.
In such a network, a mobile adversary [3] (we denote
it as ADV hereafter), which behaves in UWSNs when the
mobile sink is absent, can steal data stored in compromised
sensors without modifying any sensed data, and interfering
with communications of any sensors. In other words, the
mobile adversary is read-only data during the mobile sink
visiting interval, which is impossible to detect by the mobile
sink. When a sensor is compromised, as the corresponding
secret key is also revealed, the mobile adversary can obtain
the encrypted data using the secret key. Therefore, providing
data confidentiality is a big challenge. Additionally, in the
unattended areas, such as environment monitoring in human-
being unfriendly areas, the users of UWSNs usually interested
in some ”history” data rather ”live” data. For instance, what
is the average temperature in one month, what is the average
activities of volcano in half a year, etc,. Furthermore, in
contrast with traditional WSNs, the sensors cannot offload data
to an on-line sink at will, instead they will store the data locally
till a mobile sink accesses it to retrieve the data. Transmission
happens only when the mobile sink visits the UWSN and
broadcasts data retrieval requests. Consequently, each sensor
must accumulate sensed data and have ability to wait long
enough until a mobile sink visits it. Since the memory size of
sensor nodes is limited, the storage efficiency problem has to
be solved.
In this paper, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption
and key evolution based scheme for efficient and secure data
storage. In our scheme, secret keys of sensors are updated
in each round according to one-way hash function. In other
words, previous keys cannot be derived from current keys.
Forward secrecy is guaranteed. Additionally, storing data
collected by sensors are encrypted by using homomorphic
encryption and stored as sum of encrypted data and sum
of encrypted data squares in sensor memory. Thus, statistic
values, such as expected value, variance value, can be easily
computed based on those encrypted data values, which can
significantly reduce the storage needs. Furthermore, combined
with homomorphic encryption and key evolution, our scheme
can guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. We
show through detailed analysis that our scheme has low storage
cost and low computational cost as compared to other existing
schemes and can be suitable for resource-constraint UWSNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background and related work. In Section III,
the network model and threat model are addressed. Section
IV provides the detailed description of our proposed schemes.
Section V analyzes performance of the scheme. Finally, Sec-
tion VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce related work and some neces-
sary background for our proposed scheme.
A. Related Work
Achieving data confidentiality in UWSNs is a big challenge
because there is no an on-line sink presented. The authors
in [4] divide the data collected by sensors into three cases,
based on the time when data were compromised: a) before
compromise, b) during compromise, and c) after compromise.
Since, in case b), sensors are fully controlled, data generated
in interval b) are revealed no matter what security schemes
are adopted.
To guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy,
[4] proposed Distributed Self-Healing scheme (DISH) based
on nodes reactive cooperation that provides both forward and
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(probabilistically) backward secrecy. However, the reactive
node cooperative scheme causes extra communication over-
head. The authors in [5] proposed a proactive node cooperative
scheme which solves the aforementioned problem of [4]. How-
ever, both [4] and [5] provided merely certain probabilistically
backward secrecy, in an application scenario where reliable
communication channels or reliable sensors are needed. To
solve this problem, [5] suggested that some suitable public key
encryption technique can be used to encrypt round-specific
sensor key. However, sensors are known as computation
constrained devices that are not very suitable for public key
encryption.
B. Homomorphic Encryption
A privacy homomorphism [6] is an encryption function
which allows the encrypted data to be operated on without
the knowledge of the decryption function.
The authors in [7] proposed an additive homomor-
phic encryption scheme such that the addition of the en-
crypted messages equals the encryption of those messages’
summation. The addition of n ciphertexts,
∑n
i=1 ci =∑n
i=1Enc(mi, ki,M) =
∑n
i=1mi +
∑n
i=1 ki(mod M).
Thus, Dec(
∑n
i=1 ci) =
∑n
i=1Dec(Enc(ci, ki,M)) =∑n
i=1Enc(mi, ki,M)−
∑n
i=1 ki(mod M).
III. NETWORK MODEL, THREAT MODEL AND NOTATIONS
This section presents our network model, threat model and
notations.
A. Network Model
We consider a UWSN that consists of N sensor nodes. A
sensor node in UWSN is denoted as si(1 ≤ i ≤ N). There
is a mobile sink that visits the UWSN periodically to collect
data, (It can be more than one sink in practice. For simplicity,
we consider only one mobile sink in the paper.). The sensor
si generates data at every round, and the data generated at
round r is denoted as dri . Since sensors have specific sensing
task, we assume that data generated in each round requires the
same memory where the data are operated in GF (2p), that is
p = log2(dri ), (r ∈ (0, R]), where R is the number of rounds
between successive sink visits. We further assume that the data
dri generated in each round is not a large value (e.g., p = 64 or
160, etc, here, we don’t consider audio WSN and multimedia
WSN.). Once a data value dri is generated, dri is stored locally,
and waits until an authorized mobile sink requires them offload
it. Each sensor has the ability to perform one-way hashing and
symmetric key encryption. We assume that the mobile sink is a
trusted party which cannot be compromised. Additionally, the
mobile sink will offload the data accumulated in sensor nodes,
re-initializes the secret keys and reset the round counters when
the mobile sink visits the network.
B. Threat Model
In this paper, we investigate that ADV that is only interested
in stealing (read-only) the data from the compromised sensor
nodes and cannot be detected by the mobile sink. ADV can
compromise sensor nodes during the time interval when the
mobile sink is absent. Consequently, the mobile adversary can
visit the UWSN again and again until the whole network is
compromised by it without knowing by the mobile sink. Here,
we assume that an adversary can compromise up to v(v < N)
sensors in one interval.
C. Notations
Our notation is listed in Table I.
TABLE I: Notation
Km master key of a mobile sink
Kri secret key of sensor si at round r
Sum sum of data, Sum =
∑
d
SumEnc sum of encrypted data, SumEnc =
∑
Enc(d)
EncSum encryption of data sum, EncSum = Enc(
∑
d)
SumS sum of data square, SumS =
∑
d2
SumEncS sum of encrypted data square, SumEncS =
∑
Enc(d2)
EncSumS encryption of data square sum, EncSumS = Enc(
∑
d2)
dmax the maximum value of dri
p storage cost for dri , p = log2(dri ) (required storage size)
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a family of four schemes for
efficient and secure data storage. Our goal is to guarantee both
forward and backward secrecy while maintaining low storage
cost and low computation cost.
A. Scheme 1 (S1)
Initially, the mobile sink picks a master key denoted as Km.
The initial key of a sensor node si can be computed as Ki =
h(Km||i) which is setup before the deployment of the UWSN.
Here, || stands for the concatenation operator. The mobile sink
needs to store only one key, because it can use Km to compute
all the secret keys deployed in si (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). Then, at round
r ≥ 1, as it collects data, sensor si encrypts data dri with Ki
by Enc(Ki, dri ).
Computation of expected value and variance. 1) To compute
expected value, the mobile sink needs to retrieve the en-
crypted data Enc(d1i ), Enc(d2i ), · · · , Enc(dri ), · · · , Enc(dRi )
from the sensor si, and then decrypts the encrypted data using
its master key Km by generating corresponding secret key, that
is Ki = h(Km||i). For plaintext data d1i , d2i , · · · , dri , · · · , dRi ,
the expected value of data can be easily computed as
EXi =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i
R
. (1)
2) The variance of data can be computed as
V ari =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i − EXi)2
R
. (2)
Discussion. Before the mobile sink retrieves the data, the
sensor si generates R rounds data. So the storage cost
of encrypted data in sensor memory can be denoted as∑R
r=1 log2(Enc(d
r
i )). If the value R tends to be a very large
value, e.g., 100000, the storage cost tends to a large value as
well. Since our goal is to get expected value and variance of
data, we transform Eq.(2) as following:
V ari =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2
R
−
(∑R
r=1 d
r
i
R
)2
=
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2
R
− (
∑R
r=1 d
r
i )
2
R2
. (3)
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Given SumRi =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i and SumSRi =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2
, Eq.
(1) and Eq. (3) can be further presented as
EXi =
SumRi
R
, (4)
and
V ari =
SumSRi
R
− (Sum
R
i )
2
R2
. (5)
In other words, to compute EXi and V ari, the mobile sink
need to get SumRi , SumSRi , and R instead. Note that the
storage cost of sensors can be largely reduced if SumRi and
SumSRi are stored, instead of storing the encryptions of data
generated in each rounds.
Proposition 4.1: The storage cost of SumRi and SumSRi
is less than storing the encryptions of data generated in each
rounds, if R > 1 and p > 1.
Since in UWSN setting, given R tends to a very large value,
e.g., 10000, and p is a fixed small value, the storage cost
reduce significantly (as shown in Fig. 1) if SumRi and SumSRi
are stored instead. Thus, these motivate us to design a data
summation scheme that can reduce storage cost.
B. Scheme 2 (S2)
The S2 is detailed as follows:
Initially, the sensor si allocates two parameters Sum0i and
SumS0i in its memory, which denote summation of data and
summation of data square, respectively. The main process is
shown in Algorithm 1. At the end of the first round, the
sensor si generates the data d1i , computes its square (d1i )2,
initializes Sum1i = d1i and SumS1i = (d1i )2, encrypts them
as EncSum2i and EncSumS2i , and then stores them in its
memory. At the end of each round r, the sensor si decrypts
the EncSumr−1i and EncSumS
r−1
i to get the summation
of previous data Sumr−1i =
∑
dr−1i and the summation of
previous data square SumSr−1i =
∑
(dr−1i )
2
, adds current
data and data square to them, and stores the encrypted results
EncSumri and EncSumSri on local memory.
Computation of expected value and variance. After the
mobile sink retrieves the EncSumRi and EncSumSRi , it can
decrypt them to get summation of data SumRi and data square
SumSRi . Then, the expected value and variance can be easily
computed by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
Discussion. The scheme reduces the storage cost. However,
as shown in Algorithm 1 (steps 6,7 and 11,12), in order to
obtain Sumri and SumSri , the sensor si needs to encrypts
; /* sensor si starts round r */
collect new sensed data dri ;1 if r = 1 then2
set Sumri = d
r
i ;3
set SumSri = (d
r
i )
2;4
else5
compute Sumri = Dec(EncSum
r−1
i ) =
∑
dr−1i ;6
compute SumSri = Dec(EncSumS
r−1
i ) =
∑
(dr−1i )
2;7
compute Sumri ← Sumr−1i + dri ;8
compute SumSri ← SumSr−1i + (dri )2;9
end10
compute EncSumri = Enc(Sum
r
i , Ki, r, · · · );11
compute EncSumSri = Enc(SumS
r
i , Ki, r, · · · );12
store EncSumri , EncSumS
r
i on local storage;13
; /* end round r */
Algorithm 1: Scheme 2
and decrypts data at each round, which causes very high
computation burden. This limitation motivates us to design
next scheme that can reduce computation cost and yet maintain
low storage cost.
C. Scheme 3 (S3)
To deal with the limitation in S2, we now propose a homo-
morphic encryption based scheme. In this scheme, we utilize
additive homomorphic encryption to encrypt new sensed data
such that sum of encrypted data corresponds to encryption of
those message summation, that is
Enc(dri ) = Enc(d
r
i ,Ki,M) = d
r
i +Ki(mod M) (6)
and
Enc[(dri )
2] = Enc[(dri )
2,Ki,M
′] = (dri )
2 +Ki(mod M
′).
Due to the properties of additive homomorphic encryption,
we can obtain Enc(dri+dr+1i ) = Enc(dri )+Enc(d
r+1
i ). Thus,
EncSum and EncSumS can be obtained by
EncSum = Enc(
R∑
r=1
dri ) =
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri ) = SumEnc, (7)
and
EncSumS = Enc(
R∑
r=1
(dri )
2) =
R∑
r=1
Enc[(dri )
2] = SumEncS.
Therefore, the sensor si does not need to decrypt and
encrypt at each round to get Sum and SumS, but simply
add the encrypted data up: SumEncRi =
∑R
r=1Enc(d
r
i ) and
SumEncSRi =
∑R
r=1Enc((d
r
i )
2).
In the end of round r, as shown in Algorithm 2,
the sensor si encrypt the data dri by using homomorphic
encryption and its secret key Ki, that is, Enc(dri ) =
Enc(Ki, dri ,M) = d
r
i + Ki(mod M). Each encrypted data
is added with previous encrypted data and stored locally,
SumEncRi =
∑R
r=1Enc(d
r
i ) =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i +R∗Ki(mod M),
and SumEncSRi =
∑R
r=1Enc((d
r
i )
2) =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2 +
R ∗ Ki(mod M ′). Here, M and M ′ are defined as M =
2log2(dmax∗Rmax) and M ′ = 2log2[(dmax)2∗Rmax]. We can see
that, actually, M and M ′ are the storage costs of EncSum
and EncSumS, respectively. To decrypt the EncSum and
EncSumS, (by computing the corresponding secret key by
R ∗Ki = R ∗ h(Km||i)), the mobile sink can get SumEnc
and SumEncS as following:
; /* sensor si starts round r */
collect new sensed data dri ;1
compute Enc(dri ) = Enc(d
r
i , Ki,M) = d
r
i +Ki(mod M);2
compute3
Enc((dri )
2) = Enc((dri )
2, Ki,M
′) = (dri )
2 +Ki(mod M
′);
if r = 1 then4
SumEncri = Enc(d
r
i );5
SumEncSri = Enc((d
r
i )
2);6
else7
compute SumEncri ← SumEncr−1i + Enc(dri );8
compute SumEncSri ← SumEncSr−1i + Enc((dri )2);9
end10
store SumEncri , SumEncS
r
i on local storage;11
; /* end round r */
Algorithm 2: Scheme 3
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Sum = Dec(EncSum) = Dec(SumEnc)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )) =
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )−R ∗Ki(mod M)
=
R∑
r=1
dri (8)
and
SumS = Dec(EncSumS) = Dec(SumEncS)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2))
=
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2)−R ∗Ki(mod M ′)
=
R∑
r=1
(dri )
2. (9)
Computation of expected value and variance. After the mobile
sink retrieves the SumEnc and SumEncS, it can decrypt
them according to Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) to get Sum and SumS
by using key R ∗Ki. Then, the expected value and variance
can be easily computed according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
An Example. For simplicity, we assume that the sensor
s5 generates 3 rounds data, d15 = 11, d25 = 23, and
d35 = 18, and sets its corresponding secret key K5 = 80
with M = 100, and M ′ = 1000. Based on Eq.(6), s5 can
compute the encryption of data at the end of round 1, that is,
Enc(d15) = d
1
5+K5(mod M) = 11+80(mod 100) = 91, then
s5 stores 91 on its local memory. At the end of round 2, s5
generates new data d25 = 18; then it gets the encryption of new
data by Enc(d25) = 23+80(mod 100) = 3. Next, s5 does the
additive homomorphic encryption to get sum of data SumE =
Enc(d15) + Enc(d
2
5)(mod 100) = 91 + 3(mod 100) = 94.
And then, it stores the SumEnc = 94 on its memory.
Following the same procedure, at the end of round 3, the
s5 get SumEnc =
∑3
r=1Enc(d
r
5)(mod 100) = 82. If
the mobile sink retrieves the SumEnc from the s5, it can
decrypt it by Dec(SumEnc) = Dec(EncSum) = Sum
for SumEnc = EncSum based on Eq. (7), that is Sum =
Dec(94) = 94 − 3 ∗ 80(mod 100) = 42. The SumS can be
obtained following the same approach. Therefore, the mobile
sink can easily compute the EX5 and V ar5 based on Eq.(4)
and Eq.(5).
Discussion. Comparing to the S2, the S3 supports both low
storage cost and low computation cost. However, a problem is
raised if a ADV compromises the sensor si at round r′. The
secret key Ki of si is hold by the ADV . Consequentially,
all the data generated in previous rounds r ∈ [0, r′) will
be revealed, because the ADV can use Ki to compute
corresponding secret key (r′ − 1) ∗ Ki. Furthermore, new
generated encrypted data are also encrypted by the same key,
which means generated data can be decrypted by ADV by
using the key Ki as well. To guarantee both forward secrecy
and backward secrecy, we propose the next scheme.
D. Scheme 4(S4)
If the sensor keeps the secret unchanging, all encrypted data
can be read by ADV , no matter the data are generated before
or after the compromised period, for it only needs to com-
promise the sensor once and gets the secret key consequently.
Therefore, we need to change the secret key after each round
to guarantee that the ADV who holds the secret key Kri in
compromised period r ∈ [r′, r′′] cannot derive the secret key
K rˆi in the previous rounds rˆ ∈ [0, r′). To solve this problem,
we utilize key evolution approach [8], that is, the secret key of
a sensor node is updated by its owner. The secret key of si in
round r is computed as Kri = hr−1(K1i ), where h(·) is an one-
way hash function (Kr−1i is then securely erased.). After the
secret key Kri updates itself at the end of round r, the ADV
cannot derive the previous round’s key before the sensor was
compromised (due to h(·) one-way property). Additionally, the
mobile sink can easily compute the corresponding secret key
of sensor si in round r for Kri = hr−1(Ki) = hr−1(Km||i).
To decrypt the EncSum and EncSumS, similar to Eq. (8)
and Eq. (9), after computing the corresponding secret key
as
∑R
r=1K
r
i =
∑R
r=1 h
r−1(Km||i), the mobile sink can get
SumEnc and SumEncS as following:
Sum = Dec(EncSum) = Dec(SumEnc)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )) =
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )−
R∑
r=1
Kri (mod M)
=
R∑
r=1
dri (10)
and
SumS = Dec(EncSumS) = Dec(SumEncS)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2))
=
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2)−
R∑
r=1
Kri (mod M
′)
=
R∑
r=1
(dri )
2. (11)
Similar to S3, the S4 has the same homomorphic encryption
and decryption process but the secret key. Algorithm 3 shows
the operation process in sensor si.
; /* sensor si starts round r */
collect new sensed data dri ;1
compute Enc(dri ) = Enc(d
r
i , K
r
i ,M) = d
r
i +K
r
i (mod M);2
compute3
Enc((dri )
2) = Enc((dri )
2, Kri ,M
′) = (dri )
2 +Kri (mod M
′);
if r = 1 then4
SumEncri = Enc(d
r
i );5
SumEncSri = Enc((d
r
i )
2);6
else7
compute SumEncri ← SumEncr−1i + Eri ;8
compute SumEncSri ← SumEncSr−1i + E2ri ;9
end10
store SumEnc, SumEncS on local storage;11
compute Kr+1i = h(K
r
i );12
erase Kri securely;13
; /* end round r */
Algorithm 3: Scheme 4
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Computation of expected value and variance. After the
mobile sink retrieves the SumEnc and SumEncS, it can
decrypt them by it can decrypt them by Eq. (10) and Eq.
(11) to get Sum and SumS using the corresponding secret
key
∑R
r=1K
r
i . Then, the expected value and variance can be
easily computed by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
Proposition 4.2: The S4 can provide forward secrecy as
well as backward secrecy.
Proof: Since key evolution is adopted in the S4, the
ADV cannot derive the previous key from the current key
it hold due to the one way property of hash function, thus the
ADV cannot decrypt the data encrypted in previous rounds,
which means the forward secrecy is guaranteed. Moreover,
the data generated in previous rounds are stored as SumEnc
and SumEncS in sensor nodes. To decrypt them, the corre-
sponding secret key
∑R
r=1K
r
i is needed, which consists of all
keys generated in each rounds. Since the previous keys cannot
be derived from current key, the corresponding key
∑R
r=1K
r
i
cannot be obtained by ADV , that means backward secrecy
is guaranteed. Therefore, the S4 can guarantee both forward
secrecy and backward secrecy.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate numeric performance of the
proposed schemes with respect to storage cost, and compu-
tational cost. Security analysis is also given in this section.
A. Storage Cost
Fig.1 (left) shows the analysis results of proposed schemes
in term of storage cost. We can observe that the S1 has the
highest storage cost in all four proposed schemes no matter
p = 64 or 128, and that the rest three scheme has the lowest
storage cost, that means the storing summation of data can
significantly reduce the storage cost in sensors. We further
observe that the storage cost of S2, S3, and S4 are almost
zero when they are compared with S1, and the influence of
p cannot be identified. Therefore, as shown in Fig.1 (right),
we ignore the storage cost of S1, where only S2, S3, and
S4 are plotted in terms of p = 64 and p = 128, respectively.
We observe that p can increases with a little influence on the
storage cost.
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Fig. 1: The storage comparison between proposed schemes.
B. Computation Cost
In S1, sensors encrypts data sensed in each round and
stores them locally. In S3 and S4, sensors encrypts data by
doing simply modulo arithmetic in each round, which based
on homomorphic encryption. In S2, however, sensors decrypts
encrypted data sum, updates new data sum, and encrypts it
again which causes extra computational cost.
C. Security Analysis
In S1, S2, and S3, both forward secrecy and backward
secrecy cannot be guaranteed for the secret key is the same
in each round. Once the secret key is compromised, all the
encrypted data are revealed. As discussed in Section IV-D
Proposition 4.2, the S4 can guarantee both forward secrecy
and backward secrecy.
Finally, we summarize the comparison results between S1,
S2, S3 and S4 in TABLE II in terms of storage cost, com-
putation cost, Forward Secrecy (FSe) and Backward Secrecy
(ASe). TABLE II shows the conclusion that S4 has the best
conformance compared with the rest three schemes in terms
of storage cost and computation cost, and that S4 can further
guarantee forward secrecy and backward secrecy.
TABLE II: Performance comparison results between proposed
schemes in terms of Storage Cost, Computation Cost, Forward
Secrecy (FSe) and Backward Secrecy (ASe).
Scheme Storage Cost Computation Cost FSe ASe
S1 High High No No
S2 Low Very High No No
S3 Low Low No No
S4 Low Low Yes Yes
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel homomorphic
encryption and key evolution based scheme for efficient and
secure data storage in UWSN. Detailed analysis demonstrates
that our schemes accomplish the goals of data confidentiality
and efficiency with respect to storage and computation.
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